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Abstract Fishermen's quotas have the effect of truncat-
ing catches at the quota limit. Hence the expected catch is
smaller than the quota. A simple search model is developed
that provides an estimation of the factor by which expected
catches are reduced.
The use of allocated fishermen's quotas as a method of couti-
teracting the common property externality in commercial fish-
eries has been suggested by several resource economists
(Christy, 1973; Moloney and Pearse, 1979; Clark, 1980). It is
known that such quotas, provided that they are freely transfer-
able, are formally equivalent to landing taxes (Moloney and
Pearse, 1979; Clark, 1980). ''Formally equivalent" means, in
particular, equivalent in a deterministic world; the nonequiva-
lence of quotas and taxes in a stochastic setting has been dem-
onstrated in a general context by Weitzmann (1974).
When individual quotas are recommended for actual imple-
mentation, considerable resistance on the part of fishermen is
often encountered. It seems that many Fishermen rely on the
occasional lucky catch, and they foresee that a quota would pre-
vent them from realizing this important irregular windfall.
In this brief note a simple search model (Mangel and Clark,
1983; Mangel and Plant, 1985) is used as a vehicle for estimating
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the expected reduction in average catch rates resulting from the
introduction of an individual quota system. The degree of re-
duction depends on several factors, including the patchiness of
the distribution offish, the time period over which quotas apply,
and the extent to which groups of fishermen pool their quotas.
An interesting theoretical exercise would be to model the dy-
namics of a short-term quota market as an alternative to the
pooling of quotas (since pooling obviously brings in the possi-
bility of the "free rider"), but we do not attempt this exercise
here.
Because of the resulting reduction in average catch rates, fish-
ermen's quotas may be less effective in improving economic ef-
ficiency than would be concluded from the deterministic theory.
(The fact that quotas do reduce catch rates also establishes the
nonequivalence of quotas and taxes, since catch rates would not
be affected by taxes.) This is not to say that individual quotas
should be thrown out of consideration for fishery management,
no other feasible instrument having yet been invented to resolve
the serious externality problem. It does become apparent, how-
ever, that individual quota systems must be carefully devised,
with maximum flexibility. The pooling and transfer of quotas
should clearly be permitted and indeed facilitated. If not, the
resulting system may well prove to be more inefficient than the
system it was designed to replace.
Mathematical Analysis
Search theory has been applied to fishery problems in a series
of recent papers (Swierzbinski, 1981; Mangel, 1982; Mangel and
Clark, 1983; Mangel and Beder, 1984; Mangel and Plant, 1985).
In these works the process of searching for fish has been modeled
as a Poisson process. A more general model, which does not
presuppose a uniformly random distribution of the objects of
search, is provided by the negative-binomial distribution (Pielou,
1977), in whichEffect of Quotas on Expected Catch Rates 421
Herep(/7;A:, A:) denotes the probability of encountering AI objects
(e.g., schools offish) during a given period of search; r(jc) is the
gamma function. The negative binomial distribution can be de-
rived from a model in which search itself is a Poisson process,
but the objects of search occur in clumps, or patches, of loga-
rithmically distributed size. Both parameters x and k in Equation
(I) are directly proportional to the search rate parameter \ of
the underlying Poisson process, with coefficients depending on
the parameter a of the logarithmic distribution (Pielou, 1977, p.
120). The search rate in tum can easily be related to physical
quantities, including vessel speed, width of the search track, and
probability of detection (Mangel and Beder, 1984). In particular,
if yv searchers are searching independently, the parameters x and
k in Equation (1) are replaced by Nx and Nk, respectively. Sim-
ilarly, if the length of the search period under consideration is
lengthened by a factor T, then the parameters X, x, and k are
also all multiplied by T.
The variance of the negative binomial distribution is given by
a^ = X -^ x^/k (2)
so that the parameter A is a measure of the extent to which this
distribution differs from the Poisson distribution (for which a^
= x). Small values of the "patchiness" or "contagion" param-
eter k correspond to a highly clumped distribution of objects of
search, and vice versa; as k ^ ^ the negative binomial distri-
bution approaches the Poisson distribution.
We shall base our computations on the negative binomial dis-
tribution, although the calculations could as easily be performed
by using any other desired probability distribution.
Consider, then, an individual vessel searching for schools of
fish. In the absence of any individual quota, the expected catch
rate is x schools per unit of time, and the probability of catching
n schools in the given time unit is p{n\x, k). (The analysis refers
only to search time; time spent setting on schools that have been
encountered is not included.)422 Colin W. Clark
In the presence of a quota of Q schools per unit time period,
the probability distribution of Equation (1) becomes truncated:
p{n; X, k,Q) = { (3)
0 otherwise
where the normalization factor CQ is given by
Q
The expected catch, subject to the quota constraint, thus be-
comes
Q
E{n\ g} - 2 np{n;x,k, Q) (5)
It is easy to see that E{n; Q} < E{n} = x, and also that £"{«; Q]
-^ X as Q—> +C0. Thus the quota constraint does decrease the
individual's expected catch per unit time, the more so the smaller
the quota.
To be explicit, suppose for example that the quota Q is exactly
equal to the average catch x without quota. Let / denote the
fractional reduction in catch brought about by this quota con-
straint:
/ = fik, e) = 1 - 7^ 2 npin- Q, k, Q) (6)
n=0
The values of this reduction factor, as a function of Q and k, are
shown in Figure 1.
As expected, the reduction factor / increases as the quota Q
decreases, and also as the patchiness of the fish stock increases.
Note also that for highly patchy distributions, / does not appear
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FIGURE 1. Reduction factor / - /(A:, ()) as a function of quota (>, for various
values of the patchiness parameter k.
zero as Q ^ CO, fox fixed x, but here we are treating JT = ^ as
a single parameter).
Next, consider the possibility of pooling quotas. Suppose that
N fishermen, each having a quota of Q =^ x, agree to pool their
quotas to obtain ^.^tai = Nx = NQ. The resulting truncated
distribution then becomesp(n; ^u,,ai. Nk. Qu,,ai). The reduction
factor / can again be read from Figure 1 (or computed from
Equation (6)) by using the value Nk in place oik. For example,
with k = 1.0, ^ = 4, and N - 5, the values of/ are:
Unpooled: / - 0.61.
, Pooled; / = 0.33.
The importance of flexibility in allowing pooling or transfer of
quotas is emphasized by this one example.
Analogous considerations apply to the pooling of quotas over
time periods. For example, a quota of 10 tons per week might424 Colin W. Clark
be administered as a total quota of 100 tons over a 10-week pe-
riod. The reduction factor/, as computed from Equation (6) with
^ = 10 replaced by !2 = 100, and k replaced by 10/;, would be
smaller as a result of this time pooling.
From this point of view it would appear that time pooling of
quotas is always desirable. There may be other reasons, how-
ever, for preferring short quota periods. Long-period quotas may
result in uneven deliveries of fish to processing plants or mar-
kets, for example.
In order to estimate the reduction factor / corresponding to
any particular quota arrangement, the management authority re-
quires an estimate of the patchiness parameter k. Such an esti-
mate can be derived from data on the actual catches of individual
(similar) vessels. If jc denotes the average catch per week (for




Note, however, that Equation (7) can only be applied to data
obtained before the imposition of quotas.
The^uota Q (individual or pooled) and its corresponding total
catch Q are related by the equation
, Q)]Q
Q
2 np(n; Q, k, Q) (8)
The expression on the right side of Equation (8) is graphed in
Figure 2 for various values ofk. Given Q and k, the appropriate
quota Q can be read from this figure.
Although the curves shown in Figure 2 are not actually straight
lines, they are obviously closely approximated by such. Thus a
simple approximation to Equation (8) is100
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FIGURE 2. Expected catch Q versus quota Q for various k.
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FIGURE 3. The coefficient a(A); see Equation (9).
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Q = OLik)Q (9)
The function a(^) is plotted in Figure 3.
Summary
Because fishing is, to a certain degree, a random process, it fol-
lows that a quota constraint on individual vessels (or fishermen)
will, by removing the chance of a large catch, reduce the ex-
pected catch per vessel to a value less than the actual quota.
The greater the variability in catches, the greater will be the
reduction, which may be particuiarly severe unless pooling or
transfer of quotas (among vessels, or over time periods, or both)
is freely permitted.
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